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Martha C. Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and
Public Life. Boston: Beacon Press, 1996. Pp. xvii, 137. $20.
Thomas Morawetz*
Reclaiming the place of philosophy as a metadiscipline,1
philosophers have once more assumed the role of mediating boundary
disputes among other disciplines. As the boundaries and shapes of
various disciplines have grown vague and controversial, that role has
become particularly significant and particularly quixotic as well.2
Those who play this role have many audiences. Some speak primarily
to, and about, scholars. Others concern themselves with pedagogy.
Still others think about the impact of the disciplines on public officials
and public affairs.
The relationship of law and literature is an especially fruitful
interface for such scrutiny. Although courses on law and literature
have proliferated in law schools, accompanied by a bull market in
interdisciplinary articles, books, and journals,3 there is little
agreement about the content and purpose of these activities. Indeed,
there seem to be almost as many ways of giving content to law and
literature as there are practitioners of it. This intersection of dis-
ciplines may variously become
* Thomas Morawetz is Tapping Reeve Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of
Connecticut School of Law. He has published widely in jurisprudence, ethics, and criminal law.
1. "The notion that there is an autonomous discipline called 'philosophy,' distinct from and
sitting in judgment upon both religion and science, is of quite recent origin.... [This is] the
sense in which it has been understood as an academic subject in the nineteenth century."
RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 131 (1979). The philosophical
contributions of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Richard Rorty are widely understood as challenging
this traditional way of conceiving of philosophy, and they have been influential in doing so. See
also THE RETURN OF GRAND THEORY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Quentin Skinner ed., 1985).
2. See THE INSTITUTION OF PHILOSOPHY: A DISCIPLINE IN CRISIS (Avner Cohen & Marcelo
Dascal eds., 1989); REDRAWING THE LINES: ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY, DECONSTRUCrION,
AND LITERARY THEORY (Reed W. Dasenbrook ed., 1989).
3. The proliferation of courses and research on law and literature is discussed in Elizabeth
Villiers Gemmette, Law and Literature: Joining the Class Action, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 665 (1995).
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(a) law in literature (the depiction of lawyers, judges, and legal
practices in fiction), or
(b) law as literature (the application of theories and techniques
of understanding, borrowed from literary criticism, to legal texts
and activities), or
(c) the law of literature (consideration of the legal norms that
shape and limit literary activity and attitudes), or
(d) law as influenced by literature (examination of the role of
literature in affecting legislation, judicial practice, political
attitudes, and so on).
This list is only suggestive. Categories may be added to it, and these
four categories themselves accommodate indefinitely many agendas
and preoccupations.4
The purpose of all this activity is, if anything, more controversial
than its content. To be sure, it provides employment for defrocked
humanities scholars who have migrated to law schools in recent
decades, and it affords law students a non-narcotic diversion from the
rigors of legal doctrines and the apprehensions of study for the bar.
At the same time, the vast majority of legal academicians persist in
seeing law and literature courses and scholarship as fluff, peripheral
to the enterprise of training lawyers, and therefore dispensable and
unserious. No doubt many law students, lawyers, and judges agree.
And there is also no doubt that equally many "pure" literary scholars
continue to view their interdisciplinary cousins as adulterating the
enterprise of theorizing about literature, as tainting the delicate
dissection of transactions between readers and writers with distracting
references to politics and legal doctrine.
Such skeptics about law and literature, as self-appointed guardians
of traditional borders between the disciplines, may from one point of
view be seen as fighting a war long lost. That, at least, is likely to be
the position of scholars who have grown up without such borders,
scholars who are more at home talking about texts in general than
about legal texts or literary texts in isolation.' The existence of this
very Journal testifies to the viability and centrality of such scholarship.
4. I briefly discuss some of these possibilities in Ethics and Style: The Lesson of Literature
for Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1993).
5. Over the last thirty years, the work of such theorists as Roland Barthes and Jacques
Derrida has effected a revolution in the study of language and in our understanding of all
disciplines in which texts play an essential role. Hermeneutics, the study of the retrieval of
meaning, has focussed the attention of legal and literary scholars on problems that their text-
based enterprises have in common. Postmodern scholars are typically preoccupied with the
implications of hermeneutical questions for understanding and communication in general.
Among the most influential texts have been ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY
(Annette Layers & Colin Smith trans., 1968); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY
(Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak trans., 1976); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD
(Garrett Barden & John Cumming eds. & trans., 1975).
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In this context, "interdisciplinary studies" threatens to become a
misnomer when the disciplines themselves lose their identity and
distinctiveness.
We can distinguish, therefore, three orientations toward such
enterprises as law and literature. The first orientation-represented
no doubt by the significant majority of legal academics, lawyers, and
teachers of literature-presupposes that familiar, historically recog-
nized borders among disciplines remain reliably and unshakeably in
place. Interdisciplinary work is therefore secondary both in concep-
tion and in importance. The second orientation also presupposes that
what we mean by law and by literature has changed little, that for the
most part the study and practice of each discipline is bounded as it
has been for most of the twentieth century. But this orientation is
distinguished by a commitment to the importance of interdisciplinary
work, in particular by the argument that lawyers and law teachers
must accord literature a special place. The third orientation, as we
have seen, is characteristic of those who question the assumed borders
of disciplines and who deploy techniques, such as the deconstruction
of texts and the exploration of hermeneutical insights, that transcend
borders, arguably making them irrelevant. This third orientation
belongs distinctively to postmodern commentators.
The position that Martha Nussbaum takes in her eloquent and
passionate new book, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and
Public Life,6 and the task she sets for herself, clearly reflect the
second orientation. She accepts and adheres to familiar distinctions
between law and literature and illuminates the lessons of the latter for
the former. As her argument progresses, it seems most immediately
addressed to judges. She seeks to show that judicial decisions
informed by "the literary imagination" are likely to be sounder and
wiser than judgments reached by other means. Secondarily, she
argues that legal education and the perspectives of lawyers should
similarly be tempered by literary study.
If the focus of postmodern writers is on understanding and
meaning, the preoccupation of more traditional writers such as
Nussbaum is with morality. In her view, the lessons of literature for
law are unequivocally moral lessons, lessons that are both indispen-
sable for those who claim to do justice and unlikely to be learned in
other ways,7 such as through social interaction.' This impulse and
6. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC
LIFE (1996) [hereinafter POETIC JUSTICE].
7. See infra text accompanying note 14.
8. Nussbaum's concerns echo the notorious debates about relationships between "the two
cultures" (science and the humanities) in the early 1960's. C. P. Snow and F. R. Leavis, as
pointmen in the debates, disagreed about whether science and the humanities define two
1996] 519
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conviction lead Nussbaum to accord training in literature an essential
role in the cultivation of empathy and to accord empathy an essential
role in judging. In the following discussion, I shall fill out the details
of Nussbaum's argument (Part I), examine the implications and limits
of her literary examples and her underlying conception of literature
(Part II), and examine the implications and limits of her conception
of the constraints of law and the role of judges (Part III).
I. LITERATURE AND MORAL IMAGINATION
Poetic Justice is derived from a series of lectures first given in 1991
at Northwestern University Law School and subsequently refined
before other academic audiences. Nussbaum cites her experience
teaching a law and literature course at the University of Chicago Law
School in 1994 as shaping her arguments. Long associated with
Brown University, most recently as University Professor, she is now
professor of ethics at the University of Chicago. Her influential and
well-received earlier books include works on Aristotelian theories of
moral development9 and on the intersection of literature and moral
philosophy.1 °
Two long-standing intellectual commitments are reflected in her
agenda for law and literature. The first is a commitment to
understanding the indispensable role of emotions in judgment, in
particular the role of compassion and mercy in public judgment. The
second is a commitment to the intelligibility of the concept of "quality
of life," and to the defense of transcultural, nonrelativistic standards
for measuring and assessing it.11  What emerges from these
ingredients are "the investigation and principled defense of a
humanistic and multivalued conception of public rationality that is
powerfully exemplified in the common law tradition."12
Poetic Justice is more hortatory than analytical. It defends
unabashedly optimistic conceptions of the emotional potential of
human beings, the power of literature to educe strong, beneficent
emotions, and the capacity for wise, emotionally informed judgment
among persons in general, among lawyers in particular, and even
more particularly among judges. Nussbaum clearly rejects the more
extreme claims of multiculturalists. For her, the relevant moral
separate cultures and whether the humanities naturally have hegemony over the transmission
and refinement of morality. In claiming that role for literature, Nussbaum to some extent
follows Leavis. See F. R. LEAVIS, TWO CULTURES? THE SIGNIFICANCE OF C. P. SNOW (1962);
C. P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1964).
9. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS (1986).
10. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOvE'S KNOWLEDGE (1990).
11. See THE QUALITY OF LIFE (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
12. POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 6, at xv.
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community is Western culture as it has evolved over recent millenia
rather than the Balkanized subcultures of contemporary cultural
discourse. It is important to look more closely at these features of
her account, and to appreciate the ways in which they challenge the
intellectual fashion, at least as that fashion is represented in the work
of Jacques Derrida, Catherine MacKinnon, and Stanley Fish, rather
than, for example, William Bennett.
1 3
The essential first step of Nussbaum's argument is that persons in
general are morally educable largely because they are emotionally
educable. She is not concerned with self-regarding emotions such as
anger, anxiety, or pride but rather with the emotions that underlie our
perceptions of and transactions with others. Among the latter, certain
emotions, such as envy and fear, inhibit such transactions while
others, such as compassion, facilitate them. In Nussbaum's Aris-
totelian picture of human nature, compassion can be cultivated.
Indeed it must be cultivated if persons are to exercise sensitive and
refined moral judgment. Morality, in turn, is not a Kantian matter of
determining universal rules and their instantiations but rather a matter
of carrying out particularized acts characterized by appropriate
feelings and other-regarding intentions. Compassion in this sense
testifies against the privacy of emotions; it is possible only to the
extent that one person enters into the emotions of another. This kind
of linkage in turn makes possible moral responsiveness.
Nussbaum gives first place to literature in the triggering and
cultivation of compassion (or empathy). At first, this seems odd.
One might assume that compassion is directly evoked by social life
rather than by reading, that our capacity for compassion is tested and
aroused through the implicit demands of others, through observing
and joining their pleasures and pains. Nussbaum thinks otherwise,
apparently for two reasons. First, authors heighten and direct the
opportunities for feeling empathy. Their creative intelligence
concentrates the experience. We are single-minded in our attention
to literature even if we are inattentive in our personal encounters.
Thus, for Nussbaum, the important works of literature are those we
are "held to ... by love and fear" and not merely by "intellectual
exhilaration and rational self-interest." 4  Her second reason for
13. I have in mind Nussbaum's implicit rejection of skepticism about the coherent moral
evolution of Western culture, the kind of skepticism that is exemplified by MacKinnon's self-
styled Marxist analysis of the effects of power and bias on moral consciousness, see CATHERINE
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989), and by Fish's suggestion
that moral assumptions depend on the adventitious evolution of interpretive communities, see
STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989). The popular writings of William
Bennett are free of such qualms about power and the relativity of value. See THE BOOK OF
VIRTUES (1994); THE MORAL COMPASS (1995).
14. POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 30.
1996]
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favoring literature over social life as a goad for empathy is that
empathy includes metaphorical thinking, and literature is the main
context in which such thinking flowers. In this sense, reading
literature takes precedence over reading history: "[H]istory simply
shows us 'what happened,' whereas works of literary art show us
'things such as might happen' in a human life."15
Nussbaum has great confidence in the ability of persons in general
and legal decision-makers in particular to engage in metaphorical
thinking, guided by empathy, in their public roles. "[T]his
imagination-including its playfulness, including its eroticism-is the
necessary basis for good government of a country of equal and free
citizens. With it, reason is beneficent, steered by a generous view of
its objects; without its charity, reason is cold and cruel."16  The
implied dichotomy here is sharp. It seems to apply not only to
individuals (those with playful imagination and those without) but also
to particular judgments (those informed by playful imagination and
those informed by cold reason).
This step in her argument merits analysis. On one hand, many will
regard it as transparently (and heartwarmingly) true. Empathy,
guided by playful imagination and guiding reason, is always a good
thing; its absence is always regrettable. Thus, an empathetic decision
is necessarily better than a nonempathetic one. On the other hand,
the step involves easy, too easy, elisions. Does playful imagination
always involve beneficence and generosity-or can the play of
imagination equally well serve cruelty and selfishness? Is analytical
reason always cold and defective, or do many problems of legal
judgment require hard choices? Do such problems often require us to
disregard our empathetic impulses, however regretfully? These
questions implicate Nussbaum's conception of law and the task of
judging and will be considered in Part III.
The premises of Nussbaum's argument represent a qualified
(Aristotelian) form of individualism whereby full development of
individual moral capacities follows a describable course. The
individual who does not use his imagination to enter into the lives of
others, to apprehend both their difference and their accessibility, is
doubly doomed, doomed to a narrow and ungenerous range of
emotions and doomed to moral inadequacy. In other words,
imagination, or what Nussbaum calls "fancy,"17 is the vehicle through
which emotions are cultivated. Moreover, the exercise of fancy
develops not just any emotions but a hierarchy or ordering of
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id. at 43.
17. Id. at 13-52.
522
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emotions that makes possible responsive, generous, and particularized
actions. Individuals alone are bound to lack such ordered feelings
and are therefore incapable of refined and sophisticated moral
discrimination. Yet, as we have seen, social life itself is for Nussbaum
neither the preferred nor the necessary medium for emotional/moral
flourishing. Rather, literature is imaginative and "playful" par-
ticipation in others' lives, lives that are recreated through the prism
of the author's own imagination and thus transformed into seductive
metaphors. To be sure, a reader who has lived in chaste isolation
from others may not be the ideal beneficiary of literature's lessons,
but Nussbaum says little about how much living is a precondition for
growth through reading. In any event, the community in her version
of communitarianism is one in which persons "connect" through
authors and books.18
Although Nussbaum never describes the emotions that inform
morality or the parameters of moral judgment, the reason is neither
coyness nor relativism. If they are emotions at all, empathy and
compassion are second-order emotions; they are more accurately seen
as modes of being in touch with the emotions, feelings, expectations,
and vulnerabilities of others. What we expect from judges is not the
experience of first-order emotions-such as fear, love, anger,
distress-but the capacity to make morally significant decisions in the
light of empathy with the first-order emotions of others. Moreover,
empathy endows the judge with both closeness to and distance from
others, the closeness of access and the distance required by fairness
and justice. The latter is implicit in recognition by the judge of her
power of decision and appreciation of her separate identity.19
Thus, Nussbaum is not being coy when she declines to specify the
relevant emotions and parameters of judgment. Her position is that,
for the judge who is not compassionate, no amount of argument and
analysis can illuminate what she lacks, and for the compassionate
judge, any attempt to set down and analyze the principles and rules
of judgment will be otiose. Similarly, her argument is not relativistic.
She assumes that compassionate judges, like Tolstoy's happy
families, ° will be more alike than they are unlike. She urges judges
and all moral decision-makers to be "confident in the process that
some reasons are indeed stronger than others, that some ways of
18. Her preoccupation with empathy invites comparison with E. M. Forster's concerns in
presenting his bookish characters and admonishing them (and us) to "only connect." E. M.
FORSTER, HOWARDS END, epigraph (Vintage ed., 1970).
19. POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 75.
20. "All happy families are alike but an unhappy family is unhappy after its own fashion."
LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 13 (Rosemary Edwards ed. & trans., Penguin Books 1954).
1996] 523
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treating human beings are indeed better than others, and can be
justified as better by the giving of such reasons."21
Such an objectivist commitment can be seen as weak or strong. At
its weakest and most formal, it concedes only that any moral judge
deploys reasons that she regards as stronger than others and that for
any person who claims to make moral judgments it cannot be the case
that all "ways of treating human beings" are morally equivalent. But
Nussbaum's commitment is neither weak nor formal. "[A]s concerned
readers we search for a human good that we are trying to bring about
in and for the human community.... Our search is guided, as well,
by the judgments and responses of our fellow readers, who themselves
are seeking such a comprehensive fit."'22 In other words, Nussbaum
presupposes a broad and universal humanism to which the imaginative
and responsive reading of literature holds a key. Communication
among moral agents, facilitated by literature, will yield such har-
monious and harmonizing insights.'
II. ON LITERATURE AND MORALITY
Compelling as it is, Nussbaum's defense of the role of literature
begs questions about the nature of literature and the nature of law.
I will address questions about literature in this Part and questions
about law in the next Part.
Nussbaum examines three works of literature to illustrate her thesis:
Dickens' Hard Times, Whitman's Song of Myself, and Wright's Native
Son. Dickens receives the lion's share of attention because the
message of Hard Times so clearly inspires and tracks Nussbaum's own
message. In that novel, Dickens satirizes a mode of education, as well
as a mode of thinking, that can variously be described as utilitarian,
behaviorist, or crudely empirical. According to this view, only what
is directly observable and quantifiable counts as an ingredient of
knowledge. Usable knowledge, the only knowledge worth having,
uses hard, not soft, data. The methods of science and not the
methods of what we have come to call the humanities yield true
knowledge and offer a basis for social progress. Thus, the most
fruitful insights, the most exhilarating and effective clearing of
intellectual cobwebs, arise from applying scientific methods to human
affairs.
21. POETIC JuSTIcE, supra note 6, at 83.
22. Id. at 84.
23. Confidence in the harmonizing power of dialogue is, of course, commonplace in
contemporary political theory. The most resonant influence is the work of Jurgen Habermas.
See 1,2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1984, 1987).
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Nussbaum demonstrates that Dickens' withering critique of this
view works on two levels. The novel is not merely didactic and
argumentative but is also written to evoke and exercise the em-
pathetic capacities (the capacity for "fancy") of the reader. In other
words, the novel is itself an example of the kind of education it com-
mends. The same aims, or complementary ones, are achieved,
according to Nussbaum, by Whitman and Wright. Whitman leads us
to compare poets with judges as observers who abjure an "abstract
pseudomathematical vision of human beings" for "a rich and concrete
vision that does justice to human lives." '24 That vision embodies a
"commitment to fairness and fitness [that] does not yield to bias and
favor" but cultivates fairness as neutrality in full recognition of the
"rich historical concreteness" ' of persons.
If this commitment to seeing persons at once empathetically and
neutrally (without bias) is essential for sound judging, and if literature
is essential in showing readers how empathy and neutrality can be
compatible, then "we should seek novels that depict the special
circumstances of groups with whom we live and whom we want to
understand."'26 Wright's Native Son is, for Nussbaum, a paradigm
because it shows "how not only the external circumstances of action,
but also anger, fear, and desire have been deformed by racial hatred
and its institutional expression."'2
Thus, three disparate literary works support the argument that
empathy in fueling imagination is an essential aspect of rational
judgment in human affairs, and a fortiori in legal affairs. As a
statement of humanistic optimism, the argument can hardly be
faulted. Certainly some admirable works of literature can be used
just as Nussbaum describes, and certainly some judges in varied
situations perform their job wisely and benignly when they follow the
methods she outlines.
A serious limitation of Nussbaum's argument, however, is that it
takes a narrow, even a Procrustean, view of literature and its powers.
In this sense, her own account is criticizable on some of the same
grounds on which she disparages the utilitarian, psuedoscientific
perspective of Mr. Gradgrind in Hard Times. Just as there is more to
human nature than is accommodated in his philosophy28 and more
about the complexity and individuality of human experience to be
gleaned from reading than he is prepared to concede, so too
24. POETIC JuSTIcE, supra note 6, at 81.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 93.
27. Id. at 94.
28. "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your
philosophy." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 5.
1996]
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Nussbaum offers an artificially constricted view of human nature and
the benefits of reading. To be sure, she admits that she is selective,
but she implies that works that do not conform to her thesis are lesser
works, safely ignored: "We all know that many popular works entice
the reader through crude sentiments and the evocation of fantasies
that may involve the dehumanization of others."29 Even if we
shamefacedly put aside and censor from our awareness such works of
apparent near-pornography, much of human nature and its apprehen-
sion through literature is left out of account.
Literature and human nature.
Countless works of literature, from Sophocles through Shakespeare
and Ibsen to Faulkner and Beckett, show how hard it is to attain the
preconditions for empathy and the benign deployment of imagination
and judgment. First of all, as Freud was adept at arguing, our
emotions often operate in the service of denying rather than pursuing
self-knowledge.3" Self-knowledge, a precondition for empathy, is
often painful to achieve and often achieved in a struggle with
emotional predispositions. Even when it is achieved, self-knowledge
can destroy.31 For other personalities, self-knowledge and empathy
can be used for malign ends; Richard III is nothing if not in touch
with the feelings of others, as is every master of manipulation.32
And, often in literature, altruistic motives may serve naivet6.33
Beyond all this, literature often raises the pessimistic question of
whether an imaginative and robust understanding of others in their
complexity is compatible with mutual harmony and toleration or
whether it is an awful and burdensome kind of knowledge that
persons can hardly endure.
Dickens and Wright are special authors in this regard. Dickens has
limited empathy for his characters insofar as few of them are three-
dimensional (or round) and most are two-dimensional (or flat).34
Rather than interacting with each other and demonstrating a capacity
for change, the secondary (flat) players characteristically do star turns,
demonstrating a single exaggerated trait. They are persons as
epithets. The main (round) players are, in the eyes of many readers,
29. POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 10.
30. See generally SIGMUND FREUD, INTRODUCrORY LECrURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS (James
Strachey, ed. & trans., Norton 1976).
31. SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS REX (D.W. Myatt trans., Thurmynd Press 1994); WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR.
32. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD THE THIRD.
33. HENRIK IBSEN, THE WILD DUCK (1884) reprinted in 6 IBSEN, at 127 (James Walter
McFarlane ed. & trans., Oxford University Press 1960).
34. Generations of critics owe this distinction to E. M. FORSTER, ASPEcTS OF THE NOVEL
(1927).
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insipid and limited, however much they may be empathetic and
benign; they are easily overshadowed by the villains and the ec-
centrics." Wright's characters as well, powerful as they are in
stirring social conscience, are not notable for their complexity and
variety.
Thus, Nussbaum's curriculum for law and literature threatens to
paint an admirably optimistic view of human nature-of the relations
among emotion, rationality, imagination, and judgment-but one that
may be true neither to its inherent Protean complexity nor to the
myriad representations of it in literature.
Literature and politics.
When writers of fiction grapple with law and politics, few find
solace and cause for optimism. Many authors are persuaded that
institutions are corrupt, that law and politics represent facades and
rituals that barely hide, and indeed often facilitate, exploitation.36
Moreover, many believe and argue that the more virtuous a public
official is, the more readily she will be defeated and destroyed.37
Victory for the forces of good is always the exception.
Nussbaum says little about, and has little use for, literature that
shows the complex contexts in which empathetic and rational
judgment must operate. The problem is, of course, more complicated
than the Manichean opposition of the forces of altruism and the
forces of corruption. Many authors see and fear that the processes of
law and politics stultify even more than they corrupt, causing hope
and ambition to wither. In countless ways, literature explores these
contexts. Such literature should arguably be an important part of a
curriculum in law and literature, especially one focussed on the
capacities and opportunities of judges.
Literature and hermeneutics.
Much of Nussbaum's analysis seems to proceed on the assumption
that literary works speak to us univocally. Certainly, Dickens and
Wright hardly suffer from ambiguity, and Nussbaum analyzes
Whitman with the assurance that she has ferreted out his singular
meanings. Of course, she is correct in treating these particular works
35. Compare, for example, Uriah Heep with David Copperfield in CHARLES DICKENS,
DAVID COPPERFIELD (Nina Burgis ed., Oxford University Press 1981) or Fagin with Oliver
Twist in CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST (Oxford University Press, 1966).
36. This Rousseauist view of human institutions is displayed in countless novels, plays, and
films. See, e.g., ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING'S MEN (1946); LOUIS MALLE,
LACOMBE, LUCIEN (Nouvelles tditions de Films, 1974).
37. See, e.g., HENRIK IBSEN, AN ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE (1882), reprinted in 6 IBSEN, supra
note 33, at 19.
1996]
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with little deference to variations in meaning and understanding that
are reader-dependent. The satirical aspects of Hard Times, for
example, are hardly more dependent on the particularities of a
reader's expectations than are the hortatory aspects of a STOP sign.
Yet, the lessons of hermeneutics and theories of deconstruction are
not irrelevant. Many desirable components of a curriculum in law
and literature are works that invite endless debate and support
multiple perspectives. Works by Kafka (The Penal Colony38 , for
example), Melville (Billy Budd, Bartleby the Scrivener9) and Camus
(The Fall) only begin to fill a roster of writers for whom law is an
arena of ambiguity and danger, and judgment is a task full of
challenge and peril, both for the judge and the judged. These
complexities hardly seem to be accommodated at all in Nussbaum's
scheme.
The assumption that novels are primarily didactic and yield moral,
or at least edifying, lessons41 is a premodern assumption, well suited
to the context in which nineteenth-century novels (or novels written
in a nineteenth-century mode) were published. 2 Modernism, in the
hands of such novelists as Joyce, Kafka, Musil, and Faulkner, teaches
us to suspend the assumption that novels mirror moral and epis-
temological characteristics of the "real world" and to understand the
manipulative powers of authors to suspend and surprise realist
expectations. 3  Finally, postmodernism treats the reader's
contribution to the transaction between author and reader as
problematic. By focussing on didactic novels and by presuming to
generalize readers' responses, Nussbaum takes a premodern, if
intuitively seductive, posture toward literature.'
III. ON LAW, INSIGHT, AND EMPATHY
If Nussbaum has a constrained view of literature and its relevance,
38. FRANZ KAFKA, THE PENAL COLONY (Willa and Edwin Muir trans., 1975).
39. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, SAILOR (Penguin Books, 1986); HERMAN MELVILLE,
Bartleby the Scrivener in THE PORTABLE MELVILLE 45 (Jay Leida ed., 1952).
40. ALBERT CAMUS, THE FALL (Justin O'Brien trans., Knopf 1957).
41. POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 12.
42. According to many critics, the nineteenth century (and the decades framing it) was the
heyday of the novel, an era in which the novel represented the most familiar and commodious
medium for cultural communication and in which questions of form and content were relatively
unproblematic. The era that begins with Fielding and ends with Lawrence (the era of Dickens
and Eliot, Balzac and Flaubert, Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky) was succeeded by a period of
uncertainty and experimentation during which the terms of novelistic communication came to
be reconceived by each author.
43. The breakdown of realism and a new self-consciousness about form and method are
distinctive features of modernism in art and the theater, of course, as well as in fiction.
44. It seems plausible that this posture and these expectations are shared by most readers
of fiction.
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the same can be said for her view of law. It is, to be sure, churlish
and wrong-headed to quarrel with the idea that empathetic
imagination is more desirable than its absence, and that justice
presupposes judges who understand the lives, needs, and feelings of
those affected by their decisions. It is, however, easy to exaggerate
this warm insight.
Consider Nussbaum's claim that empathetic "imagin-
ation-including its playfulness, including its eroticism-is the
necessary basis for good government of a country of free and equal
citizens. With it, reason is beneficent, steered by a generous view of
its objects; without its charity, reason is cold and cruel."45 Here,
there seem to be two notions, that playful imagination insures
beneficent judging (and law-making) and that generosity should never
be absent from the workings of law. The first and less important
notion posits an ideal that one wishes were true. But, as history,
literature, and personal experience too often show, the links between
imagination and beneficence (or generosity) cannot be assumed.
Nussbaum, drawing inspiration from Aristotle, wants us to join the
two dimensions of empathy, the cognitive and the motivational, to
convince us that to understand others is to be disposed to treat them
altruistically. The claim is attractive in positing an ideal, but the
debate regrettably remains open.
The second notion, about links between generosity and law, leads
Nussbaum to criticize such legal theorists as Herbert Wechsler and
Stanley Fish. Against Wechsler, she emphasizes that neutral
principles in law must always be tempered by "as rich and
comprehensive an understanding as possible of the situation of the
group involved in the case, '46 that one must always see legal
claimants "as individuals with their own stories to tell., 47  She
attacks Fish for arguing that once you "take away extrahistorical
justification ... you do away with all rational justification. You are
left with causes but not good reasons., 48 Nussbaum counters that
the understanding that comes with empathy supplies its own good
reasons, its own ethical justification.
Nussbaum criticizes Wechsler and Fish as too ethereal and seeks to
bring them down to earth, but she performs her own acts of levitation.
Although no one would question that it is highly desirable for judges
to understand the background, circumstances, and feelings of parties
to the case, these facts are not all always relevant, nor do they always
45. POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 11 at 43.
46. Id. at 89-90.
47. Id. at 96.
48. Id. at 84.
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inspire generosity. First of all, one must raise the question,
"Generous to whom?" It is not possible to be generous to both sides
in a case, at least insofar as litigation is a zero-sum game.49
Second, generosity and justice are strange bedfellows. To be just,
on a common understanding of the term, is to give persons what they
deserve; to be generous is to give them more than they deserve.
Justice may require us to curtail or limit our generosity. Moreover,
justice is often depicted as blind-blind, that is, to the individual
characteristics that often appropriately inspire generosity.0
Third, it is an over-familiar but uncomfortable fact that desert
according to moral claims and desert as measured by legal claims are
often different matters. In applying the law, insofar as it is clear and
therefore perhaps inflexible, a judge may be prohibited from being
beneficent.
Finally and most importantly, fully to inhabit the circumstances of
a criminal defendant and listen to the "story" she would tell is almost
certainly to exercise generosity in the direction of forgiveness.
Responsibility according to the criminal law is typically imposed on
those least able to comply because of wholly understandable personal
histories and attitudes. Just as psychiatrists, in their pursuit of
understanding, refrain from blaming and assigning guilt, so too all
empathetic listeners characteristically move from blame to tolerance
to (at least partial) forgiveness. But law exists to enforce respon-
sibility even when it is barely reasonable to expect compliance.
None of this implies that imaginative understanding and generosity
have no place in law, or that it is anything but desirable to have
judges with such dispositions. But the predicament of such judges is
often complex, harsh, and painful. Nussbaum offers too little
discussion of these hard choices.
IV. CONCLUSION
The picture of human nature, of law and judging, and of the
contribution of literature to law that Nussbaum evokes is immensely
attractive. It posits an ideal of harmony and beneficence at many
levels. Literature is a vehicle for cultivating beneficent habits of mind
and heart by which we gain access and insight into the lives of others.
Such habits of mind, through imagination, make possible just and
generous institutions and social relationships of mutual understanding.
At the same time, literature, like other domains of experience, has
endless effects. It may lead us to understand our limits as well as our
49. Perhaps the story of the judgment of Solomon is the exception that proves the rule.
50. I am indebted for this observation to Richard Kay.
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strengths, our capacity for evil as well as for good, our capacity for
insensitivity and confusion as well as for empathy and mutual
transparency. It is possible, and often desirable, to focus on literary
works that cast our common humanity in a positive light. As many
writers know, however, what is common is not necessarily positive and
what is positive is not necessarily common.
Literature teaches many kinds of lessons. Nussbaum's argument is
compelling when she stresses the importance for judges of an
informed and imaginative understanding of how lives are affected by
their reasoned judgment. Her argument is less compelling, or at least
less clear, when it presumes to tell us what lessons literature yields
and how those lessons may inform justice. If the ideal of empathetic
justice and the arguments articulating it are more tentative than
Nussbaum admits, the ideal is still a venerated one worth reasserting
on the cusp of the new millenium.
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